So here is something silly I was running up against. In the end its super simple, but its not obvious, and not easy to google for.
I want to equip the new servers are are installing with a standard weekly reboot schedule.
I created a batch file that launched shutdown.exe with some fancy parameters, and set this up as a scheduled task for each server.
I created a special domain account called sa-scheduledreboot with normal user rights, and rights to access the share, and of course the famous “log on as a batch job” privilege, granted to each server via Group Policy.
But dispite this, rather textbook, rights scenario, I was continuously getting “Could not Start”
However, if I ran the command using Runas, using the credentials of the sa-scheduledreboot account, it would work fine.
The Scheduled Task eventlog showed the following:
“Task Scheduler Service”
“Sheduled Reboot.job” (Reboot.cmd) 5/13/2008 5:43:54 PM ** ERROR **
Unable to start task.
The specific error is:
0×80070005: Access is denied.
Try using the Task page Browse button to locate the application.
I spent all several hours trying to find out where the “access denied” came from. Eventually, I stumbled apon this:
as it turns out:
In Windows Server 2003, the Users group does not have Read and Execute permissions to the command processor (Cmd.exe). By default, the Cmd.exe program has the following permissions settings:
• The Interactive implicit group and the Service implicit group have Read and Execute permissions.
Note On a member server, the TelnetClients group also has Read and Execute permissions. On a domain controller, the Batch implicit group also has Read and Execute permissions.
• The Administrators group and the System implicit group have Full Control permissions.
One of those quirky things you just have to know.
The way I have solved this, is that I have created a special Domain Local security group called RG_command_processor_execute (RG stands for Resource Group)
This group will allow me to control this specific privilege, and assign it to accounts, usually service accounts, that require the access to cmd.exe to run batch files.
I have added sa-scheduledreboot to this group.
I dont want to mess around on each individual server, so I have made it standard that -all- security settings, including changes to default ACL’s, should happen via Group Policy.
For this we use the File System section of the Security Settings part of a Group Policy Object.
We can add files and folders here, and define how their ACL should look.
The tricky bit is that you have to remember that this Group Policy setting overrides and replaces the original ACL on the object.
Thats a bit annoying, cause it means I have to replicate its current ACL’s, including any special permissions assigned to implicit security groups.
The KB article shows two ways to do this.
The first is to add the account or group directly to cmd.exe. ACL
the second is to add the BATCH group to the cmd.exe ACL
The second option is interesting, because the BATCH built-in group implicitly includes all batch files that run on the system.
The way that would go would be:
sa-scheduledreboot –>member of–> RG_command_processor_execute –>member of–> %hostname%/BATCH –>applied to–> (ACL of) cmd.exe
This looked like a good option for a while, until I realized it was perhaps a bit broad. (all batch files, including those run by rogue processes? )
And since it only applies to batch files, if I ever needed to grant anything other than a batch file (say, a resident program or agent), that right, I would have to assign the group directly anyway.
So I decided to add the group directly to the resource, which also makes it easier to see what the ACL change is for, for anyone examining the GPO.
sa-scheduledreboot –>member of–> RG_command_processor_execute –>applied to–> (ACL of) cmd.exe
The scheduled reboot command works fine now. And I am confident I did not assign any more rights that I absolutely needed to to get it to work. (In contrast, the previous reboot account had domain admin rights).
The only thing I need to do now, is to remove many other rights from the sa-scheduledreboot service account.
Its currently a member of Domain Users, and that grants a load of rights this account certainly does not need. I will look more closely into that at a later time, as my solution will have to cover many service accounts, not just this one.
By giving out the exact rights needed in a very granular way for each service account I need, I can far more easily restrict ALL service accounts in other ways, all at once, making them useless to use for any other purpose than what they where intended for.
Documenting this is gong to be a challenge.
I need to document exactly what I am doing in the GPO that assigns the rights to these servers, and why each option was chosen the way it was.
I need to document the exact rights of the sa-scheduledreboot
And if I develop a blanket method to restrict ALL servuice accounts in other, general ways, I need to document that too!
I better get to it!